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O
n July 31, 2008, the 
Constitutional Court of 
Colombia (the Court) handed 
down a decision (T-760/2008) that 
ordered a dramatic restructuring of 
the country’s health system [1]. The 
judgment came as the culmination of a 
wave of litigation to enforce the right to 
health, with tens of thousands of health 
rights cases before the Colombian 
courts each year [2]. Since 1992, the 
Court has staunchly upheld rights to 
access and treatment in the context 
of a highly neoliberal state, and has 
not shied away from decisions with 
considerable resource implications. 
Colombia is a striking example 
of how broader regional and global 
trends can have an impact on judicial 
enforcement of claims for health goods 
and services [3–6]. However, there is a 
wide-ranging debate in public health 
circles about the appropriateness and 
impact of such judicial interventions 
on health policy and health equity [5]. 
Critics question, for example, whether 
judicial activism distorts priority-
setting and undermines the role of 
administrative and legislative bodies 
[3–5,7].
Although it is too early to judge 
the implementation of the July 2008 
decision, the sweeping 411-page 
judgment reaffirms that courts can 
enforce access to health goods and 
services as a matter of fundamental 
rights, even when there are substantial 
resource implications. It further 
indicates that courts can creatively 
define their role in health priority-
setting.
Background
Colombia is a middle-income country 
with a per capita gross domestic 
product of US$7,304 (purchasing 
power parity 2005), and a Gini 
coefficient of 58.6, reflecting a level 
of economic inequality that is among 
the highest in the world [8]. Almost 
two-thirds of the 46 million population 
live below the poverty line [8]. In 
Colombia, a tradition of creating 
democratic institutions has coexisted 
with a reality of authoritarianism and 
enormous political violence, notably 
the 50-year-old armed conflict [9].
The 1990s brought dramatic, albeit 
contradictory, changes to both the 
judicial and health systems. The 1991 
Constitution created a Constitutional 
Court, together with mechanisms such 
as the tutela (protection writ) to protect 
individual rights, and greatly enhanced 
the public’s access to the courts 
through unfettered standing and lack 
of procedural requirements [10]. 
In 1993, the Colombian health care 
system underwent a major reform, with 
the passage of Law 100. In keeping with 
neoliberal ideas for sectoral adjustment 
in the early 1990s, Law 100 shifted 
government subsidies from supply to 
demand and created a “competitive 
surrogate model” that usedpublic
and private insurers as surrogates 
to purchase healthcare for insured 
patients, with the goal of improving 
efficiency [11]. It also established a 
two-tier system of benefits: (i) the 
contributory regime (Plan Obligatorio 
de Salud, or POS) for those formally 
employed or earning more than 
twice the minimum wage, and (ii) the 
subsidized regime (Plan Obligatorio de 
Salud Subsidiado, POSS), which includes 
approximately one-half of the benefits 
in the contributory regime [11–13].
History of Judicial Enforcement of 
the Right to Health
Although coverage has increased since 
1993, the Colombian health system 
has been widely criticized—efficiency 
and quality gains have generally 
not materialized, and patients have 
increasingly turned to the courts to 
secure treatments and services [11–18].
Between 1999 and 2005, the Human 
Rights Ombuds Office calculates that 
328,191 tutelas were presented relating 
to the right to health; in approximately 
80% of those cases the tutela was 
granted [14]. Unlike the common 
law system, the vast majority of these 
cases resolved only the dispute in 
the individual case before the court. 
Nevertheless, the sharply increasing 
numbers of tutelas—approximately
90,000 per year by 2008—are alarming 
[2,14,19].
According to the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court, which 
reviews tutela judgments from courts 
throughout the country, the right to 
health is enforceable for plaintiffs 
unable to afford care: (i) when there 
is an inextricable relationship with 
“fundamental rights,” including the 
right to life, such that if the right to 
health were not protected immediately 
it would result in the violation of 
these latter rights; (ii) when the case 
involves a person or group of people 
in especially vulnerable circumstances, 
such as children, pregnant women, or 
the elderly; and (iii) when the health 
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good or service at issue is included 
in the POS/POSS, which the Court 
has taken to define a minimum core 
content of the right to health. 
Based on these criteria, the Court 
has ordered the provision of a 
wide range of goods and services, 
including antiretrovirals, costly cancer 
medications, and even the financing 
of treatment of patients abroad when 
appropriate treatment was unavailable 
in Colombia. Likewise, the Court has 
exercised judicial control over the 
procedures used to determine benefits 
in the POS, as well as those used to 
determine beneficiaries of subsidized 
care [2,14,19].
In cases where the Court orders 
provision of care not included in 
the POS/POSS, a government 
Solidarity and Guarantee Fund 
(Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía,
FOSYGA) is required to reimburse 
the provider for expenses incurred, 
which has resulted in the majority of 
FOSYGA’s budget being dedicated to 
the implementation of tutelas [20]. 
Compliance with individual judgments, 
as well as broader orders, has often 
been slow and irregular, largely due to 
the inordinately complex procedures 
through which the state reimburses the 
entities providing the care ordered by 
the courts [1,2,14,19].
However, there is no question that 
use of tutelas, and the judgments of 
the Court in particular, have had a 
dramatic impact on prospective health 
policy-making and budgeting and the 
enforcement of existing laws [20]. For 
example, judgments from the Court 
have led to the modification of the 
POS to include viral load tests for HIV 
(T-654/2004); similarly, when the 
Court found proposed budget cuts to 
the POSS to constitute impermissible 
retrogression (backsliding), the budget 
was revised (C-1165/2000). 
On the other hand, the 
overwhelming preponderance of cases 
in which courts have enforced the right 
to health in the country as a whole 
relate to health goods and services that 
the state had already agreed to provide. 
A recent study by the National Human 
Rights Ombuds Office found that 
between 1999 and 2005 approximately 
89% of the surgeries, 93% of the 
treatments, and 84% of the procedures 
that were petitioned for using tutelas
were already included in the POS or 
POSS. These findings suggest a health 
system with little capacity for internal 
regulation, where judicial recourse has 
become, according to a 2008 report 
from the Attorney General’s Office, an 
“escape valve” [14,19]. 
A Landmark Decision
T-760/2008 collects 22 tutelas (20 
brought by individuals and two brought 
by insurance companies), which were 
selected in order to illustrate systemic 
problems in the health system that have 
led to the overuse of the tutela. The 
judgment resolves not only the 22 cases 
before the court, but also calls for the 
transformation of the entire system. 
The Court asserted this structural 
approach was necessary because “the 
organs of government responsible 
for…the regulation of the health 
system have not adopted decisions that 
guarantee the right to health without 
having to seek recourse through the 
tutela” [1].
Indeed, 20 of the 22 cases relate to 
principles that the Court has repeatedly 
established, but that health care 
providers and insurance companies 
continue to fail to assimilate in their 
policies due to a failure of oversight 
and regulation [1]. Among those cases 
were restrictions on access to care 
stemming from inappropriate transfers 
of administrative costs to patients and 
failures to make access effective (e.g., 
by ignoring transportation needs), 
as well as restrictions on access to 
care “necessary for the adequate 
development of a child” (cochlear 
implant) and for catastrophic 
conditions. The Court reiterates 
and clarifies its ample jurisprudence 
regarding the enforceability of the 
right to health in such cases and also 
calls for measures to reduce recourse 
to tutelas, including increased authority 
for the scientific-technical committees 
of insurance companies [1].
Some cases also addressed the 
freedom to choose among providers 
and the process for determining 
whether a given service was included 
in the POS (e.g., intraocular lens). 
Further, two cases were taken from 
insurance companies regarding 
reimbursement for services not 
included in the POS, and adjustments 
in the regulations regarding 
reimbursements. The Court analyzes 
these cases in terms of state failures to 
protect the right to health. It calls for: 
(i) transparency in determinations of 
POS benefits as well as institutional 
performance audits to inform users 
about the performance of different 
providers and insurance entities, in 
particular in relation to the numbers 
of tutelas their affiliated patients must 
bring to secure care; and (ii) measures 
to facilitate execution of tutelas, as 
well as the adoption of a contingency 
plan to ensure appropriate and timely 
reimbursements in the event of costs 
associated with care not covered under 
the POS/POSS [1]. 
The Court goes even further, 
however, calling for restructuring of the 
benefit plans themselves. In keeping 
with what the legislature itself ordered 
in 2007 (Law 1122), the judgment 
directs the National Commission for 
Health Regulation to immediately and 
on an annual basis comprehensively 
update the benefits included in 
the POS/POSS through a process 
that includes “direct and effective 
participation of the medical community 
and the users of the health system” [1]. 
Citing the government’s failure to take 
any steps toward a unification of plans 
since the adoption of Law 100, the 
Court further orders the appropriate 
executive agencies to unify the benefit 
plans (POS and POSS), initially for 
children and later for adults, in the 
latter case progressively and taking into 
account financial sustainability, as well 
as the epidemiological profile of the 
population. The process of devising a 
unification plan is to be participatory, 
transparent, and evidence-based, and 
must include relevant indicators and 
benchmarks [1].
The judgment calls upon the 
government to adopt deliberate 
measures to progressively realize 
universal coverage by 2010, and sets 
various compliance deadlines in 2008 
and 2009 [1]. Although it is too early 
to judge implementation of the July 
decision, in August, the Minister of 
Social Protection stated publicly that a 
timetable for the unification of the POS 
and POSS was being drawn up, but 
estimated that it would cost as much 
as 6.5 trillion pesos (approximately 
US$3.25 billion), which he asserted 
“the State does not have” [21]. At the 
same time, the Minister reported that 
immediate orders, such as provisions 
for the expanded authority of scientific-
technical committees, were being 
implemented [22]. In September, 
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the Ministry of Social Protection 
a comprehensive list of questions 
regarding Law 100, Law 1122 of 2007, 
and the plans for follow-up on T-760 
[23].
Discussion
The Court’s decision is notable in 
many respects, not least of which is 
its explicit adoption of the right to 
health framework set out by the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UN ESC 
Rights Committee) and clarified 
through the work of the first Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health 
[24]. In keeping with the UN ESC 
Rights Committee’s interpretation 
of the right to health, the Court: (i) 
elaborates on the multiple dimensions 
of state obligations that flow from the 
right to health, and how oversight 
is essential to protecting the right to 
health as well as to accountability; (ii) 
reiterates that the state is responsible 
for adopting deliberate measures 
to achieve progressive realization 
of the right to health and that 
retrogression (backsliding) is generally 
impermissible; and (iii) asserts that the 
right to health calls for transparency 
and access to information, as well as for 
evidence-based planning and coverage 
decisions based on participatory 
processes [1,24].
Further, the Court reaffirms its 
jurisprudence distinguishing an 
essential minimum core of the right to 
health based on the POS/POSS, which 
is immediately enforceable, and other 
elements that are subject to progressive 
realization, taking into account 
resource constraints [1,24]. This 
approach contrasts with, e.g., the South 
African Constitutional Court, which has 
rejected the notion of a minimum core 
that can be enforced without regard to 
resources, and has instead focused on 
“reasonableness” [25]. 
However, the Colombian Court is 
not alone in enforcing programmatic 
claims for health services that have 
significant economic impacts. Across 
Latin America—a region characterized 
by rights-rich constitutions, high social 
exclusion, and systemic failures of 
representation by the political branches 
of government—and especially in 
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Costa 
Rica, courts have enforced access to 
HIV/AIDS medications as well as to 
a wide range of other treatments and 
services. In Costa Rica, the first ten 
years of operation of the Sala IV, as 
the Constitutional chamber of the 
Supreme Court is known, witnessed an 
increase in the amparo (similar to the 
Colombian tutela) caseload from less 
than 1,000 cases to over 11,000 in 2001, 
a substantial and growing fraction of 
which relate to health claims [6]. In 
Brazil, thousands of court cases have 
been brought since 1992 relating to 
access to medications—many of which 
are highly costly and not included in 
Brazil’s national health plan—resulting 
in distortions of the health budget 
[3,5]. In Argentina, as in Colombia, 
the Supreme Court has gone beyond 
issuing relief in individual cases to 
examining policies and regulations 
in the health sector, for example, 
ordering medical coverage for persons 
with HIV/AIDS and other vulnerable 
groups, as well as enforcing the 
extension of medical coverage under 
prepaid health plans, and granting 
interim relief to assure access to care in 
emergency situations [26].
Although it is too soon to say, the 
structural approach adopted by the 
Court suggests that it might avoid at 
least some of the pitfalls associated 
with some of its prior decisions, as well 
as with the judicialization of health 
policy-making in general [27,28]. For 
example, the Court does not assume 
it knows best what benefits should 
be included under the POS/POSS, 
nor the precise ethical grounds for 
making these determinations. Rather, 
in keeping with recent proposals 
in health ethics, the decision calls 
for a participatory process that 
is transparent, based on relevant 
reasons and current epidemiological 
information, subject to revision, 
and enforceable [29–31]. As it did 
in a similar structural order related 
to internally displaced persons (T-
025/2004), the Court appears likely 
to adopt creative mechanisms for 
the supervision of this judgment, 
including public hearings with multiple 
stakeholders from government as 
well as civil society. However, in 2009 
the Court’s composition will change 
substantially, and it is unclear whether 
the new Court will assume the same 
degree of responsibility for overseeing 
the implementation of the judgment’s 
complex structural orders.
Further, this decision, like most 
of the Court’s other decisions, is 
directed at enforcing access to 
services, treatments, and medications. 
In the past, the Court has adopted 
some sweeping decisions with 
regard to public health measures, 
such as vaccination campaigns for 
poor children (SU-225/1998). Yet, 
paradoxically, the overall trend in 
judicial activism may in fact reinforce 
the effects of the 1993 health reform, 
which invested the majority of the 
health budget in individual insurance 
at the expense of public health 
promotion and prevention. Empirical 
investigation is needed to determine 
whether health resources are increased 
or merely shifted, what the effects on 
equity are, and whether the overall 
health system’s infrastructure and 
workforce, as well as health promotion 
and prevention activities, are neglected 
as a result of policies stemming from 
the decision. 
Yet, the impacts of the Court’s 
activism in relation to the right to 
health should not be evaluated in 
isolation from its consideration of other 
economic and social rights, including 
housing and education—which are 
critical social determinants of health—
as well as its progressive treatment 
with respect to gender and ethnic 
discrimination [32–34]. Further, grass-
roots groups have found in the Court’s 
jurisprudence a political banner that 
inspires them to use legal strategies to 
vindicate rights and seek social change 
[34]. Nonetheless, Colombia remains a 
profoundly unequal society, and there 
are clearly limits to the role of the 
Court in restructuring the fundamental 
social disparities that underlie many 
health inequalities. 
Conclusions
To a greater extent than in any other 
country, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court has exercised dramatic control 
over health policies and programming 
decisions. The Colombian example 
shows that increased access to courts 
may under certain circumstances 
enhance the protection of the right 
to health, as well as potentially 
promote equity and transparency 
in coverage definitions and greater 
accountability within the health system 
itself. However, further investigation is 
required with regard to the empirical 
effects of this judgment on the 
organization of an integrated health 
system, health budget-setting, and the PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0150 February 2009  |  Volume 6  |  Issue 2  |  e1000032
availability, accessibility, acceptability, 
and quality of health facilities, goods, 
and services in Colombia. 
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